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Introduction
Linguists and philosophers have for centuries
debated the place of language in how humans
think about their world. While there appears to
be a general agreement that language is a
crucial window to reality, the extent to which it
can actually shape our conceptualization of
reality has been a contentious issue. One of the
debates on this issue centres around the principle
of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, which states that the world
looks significantly different in different
languages, and that humans understand their
world in terms of the conceptual categories
made available to them by their languages.
While the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has been
generally discredited in mainstream linguistics
as a gross overestimation of language, recent
developments in cognitive linguistics and
cognitive science suggest that cross-linguistic
differences must be factored in for a fuller
understanding of the language-cognition
relationship. The present note seeks to salvage
certain elements of linguistic relativity from the
widespread rejection that the principle has been
subjected to by linguists and philosophers alike.
The title of this note has been adapted from
Guy Deutscher’s popular read on linguistic
relativity, The language glass: Why the world
looks different in other languages. I will begin
with a statement of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,
followed by an overview of the recent empirical
investigations into the cognitive dimension of
cross-linguistic diversity, sometimes referred to
as Neo-Whorfianism. I will conclude the
discussion with some pedagogical implications
of this renewed interest in the cognitive
underpinnings of language diversity.
Sapir-Whorf  Hypothesis
The hypothesis that people understand reality
in terms of the linguistic categories made
available to them by their languages was born
out of the claims of the linguistic anthropologist
Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee
Whorf, an amateur linguist. Sapir made a
comparative study of English and several
Amerindian languages, and concluded that the
differences between the languages changed the
way their users perceived the world. Sapir
spoke of  “the tyrannical hold” that linguistic
form has over our orientation in the world, and
noted that speakers of different languages are
required to pay attention to different aspects of
reality simply to put words together into
grammatical sentences. Thus, when English
speakers have to decide on whether or not to
choose the past tense marker -ed at the end of
the verb, they need to pay attention to the relative
time of occurrence of the event, vis-à-vis the
time of utterance. In contrast, the speakers of
Wintu, an Amerindian language with evidential
marking need not worry about the event time,
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but must pay attention to whether the action
talked about was known through direct
observation or by hearsay (Sapir, 1921). Sapir
(1924)  went on to suggest that the
incommensurable analysis of experience in
different languages makes “very real to us a
kind of relativity that is generally hidden from
us by our naive acceptance of fixed habits of
speech as guides to an objective understanding
of the nature of experience. This is the relativity
of concepts or, as it might be called, the relativity
of the form of thought” (Sapir, 1924: 155).
The differences in the aspects of reality that a
speaker has to attend to was taken up by Whorf
(1956), who argued that Hopi, one of the
languages he studied, had “no words,
grammatical forms, constructions or expressions
that refer directly to what we call ‘time’.” He
also reported that the speakers of Hopi had “no
general notion or intuition of time as a smooth
flowing continuum in which everything in the
universe proceeds at equal rate, out of a future,
through the present, into the past…”, and
concluded that these linguistic differences lead
to conceptual differences. According to Whorf,
the Hopi conceptualization of events did not view
points or durations as countable things. Rather,
they seemed to focus on the process, and on
the distinctions between the presently known,
conjectured or mythical. In a much-quoted
passage, he wrote:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by
our native languages. The categories and
types that we isolate from the world of
phenomena we do not find there because
they stare every observer in the face; on
the contrary, the world is presented in a
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has
to be organized  by our minds—and this
means largely by the linguistic systems in
our minds. We cut nature up, organize it
into concepts, and ascribe significances as
we do, largely because we are parties to
an agreement to organize it in this way—
an agreement that holds throughout our
speech community and is codified in the
patterns of our language (Whorf, 1956:
213).
If it is accepted that linguistic differences trigger
different conceptualizations of the world, the
next logical step would be to claim that language
determines conceptualization. The two steps in
the Whorfian argument have since been cast
into a binary of the weaker and stronger versions
of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also termed as
linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism
respectively. According to this oversimplified
binary,  the weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis claims that linguistic differences lead
to the world being cut up in different ways in
terms of the conceptual categories made
available by a language. Whereas the stronger
version  claims that the way a language cuts up
the world determines how its speakers
conceptualize their world.
Although the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is known
by the names of Edward Sapir and Benjamin
Whorf, the principle of linguistic relativity can
be traced back to the reflections of Wilhelm von
Humboldt on linguistic diversity. Humboldt made
a radical departure from the philological
ruminations of his predecessors and
contemporaries by nurturing unknown European
languages (e.g. Basque), which deviated
considerably from the Latin mould. Humboldt
wrote that the profound dissimilarities among
languages were a window into a world that
needed to be explored, as language was “the
forming organ of thought” (as cited in Deutscher,
2010). In the domain of anthropology, the works
of Franz Boas, who argued that there is an
indirect relationship between the culture of a
tribe and the language that they speak, have
had an obvious influence on the formulation of
linguistic relativity. It was Boas who drew the
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attention of the linguists to the Eskimo snow
vocabulary as an evidence of how language and
culture were closely intertwined (Boas, 1911).
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has been invoked
very creatively both by its detractors and
supporters. The stronger version of the
hypothesis has been labelled with pejoratives
such as “the great Eskimo vocabulary hoax”
(Pullum, 1991), and “a collective suspension of
disbelief” (Pinker, 1994), employed to debunk it
as an anthropological canard.  In an essay
bearing this title, Pullum severely criticises the
manner in which an incidental observation by
Franz Boas about the number of snow words in
the language of the Eskimos, has been blown
out of proportion. Pullum compares the reference
to Eskimo vocabulary to a general tendency
among anthropologists reporting on indigenous
cultures to overstate their case: “And the alleged
lexical extravagance of the Eskimos comports
so well with many other facets of their
polysynthetic perversity: rubbing noses; lending
their wives to strangers; eating raw seal blubber;
throwing grandma out to be eaten by polar
bears” (Pullum, 1991: 162). Probably the
strongest criticism of the hypothesis comes from
Pinker (1994), who debunks linguistic
determinism “a conventional absurdity”. Pinker
writes:
The famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of
linguistic determinism, stating that people’s
thoughts are determined by the categories
made available by their language, and its
weaker version, linguistic relativity, that
differences among languages cause
differences in the thoughts of their speakers
[…] is wrong, all wrong. The idea that
thought is the same as language is an
example of what can be called a
conventional absurdity (Pinker, 1994: 57).
Despite this skepticism, linguistic determinism
has found expression in contemporary social
movements organized around language, as well
as in popular culture. The feminist critique of
language which looks upon language as a mode
of consolidating a patriarchal world order
indirectly subscribes to linguistic determinism of
some variety. The reformist agenda of the
feminist does so even more directly as it rests
on the assumption that changing how we talk
about women will change how we think about
them. Perhaps the most notable statement of
linguistic determinism in popular culture comes
in the dystopian vision of the Orwellian
Newspeak that looks upon language as the
ultimate technology for thought control. Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty Four is one of the most
powerful critiques of historical revisionism of
the kind practised by dictatorial regimes, where
language is projected as an instrument not only
for re-writing the past but also for controlling
the present.
Neo-Whorfian Shift in Linguistics
Mainstream linguistic thought in the latter half
of twentieth century has been shaped by two
tenets: a) universalism and b) modularity.
Universalism defines the dominant narrative in
linguistics in terms of the theory of universal
grammar, pushing cross-linguistic differences to
the margins of linguistic inquiry. Modularity
dictates that the faculty of language is equated
with what is referred to as the computational-
representational system or the narrow syntax,
while the conceptual-intentional system merely
defines the external legibility conditions on the
faculty of language (Chomsky, 1995).
With the emergence of cognitive linguistics in
early 1990s, the focus of linguistic enquiry
appears to be shifting away from these tenets.
While universalism continues to occupy an
important place in linguistic thought, the
universalist narrative has become more
inclusive, as the modularity tenet has been
seriously questioned by the cognitive linguistic
assumptions about the cross-modular nature of
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linguistic operations. Thus the new universalism
is not about a universal grammar of language,
but a universal grammar of linguistic and
conceptual systems (Langacker, 1999, 2009).
An inevitable consequence of this shift of focus
has been the renewed interest in the empirically
attested cross-linguistic differences, and how
such differences might shape or influence the
conceptual structures underpinning language.
Empirical studies investigating the issue of how
cross-linguistic differences may give rise to
differences in patterns of conceptualization
cover a broad spectrum, encompassing linguistic
phenomena such as spatial and temporal
expressions, mass-count distinction in nominal
expressions, semantic versus grammatical
gender, causal relations, and several others. The
research question common to all these
investigations can be stated as follows:
Languages differ in the way they describe the
world. Do these cross-linguistic differences give
rise to differences in the way language users
cognize their world? Behavioural studies suggest
that language does play a mediating role in the
conceptualization of reality. Let us consider
some of these studies below.
It is well known that languages differ in how
they encode spatial locations such as left-right
and spatial relations such as containment and
support. Let us take up spatial locations first.
Levinson (1996) noted that while most European
languages use a relative spatial frames such as
left-right and front-back to describe locations
of objects, Tzeltal, a Mayan language relies
heavily on absolute reference (roughly
translatable into the English North-South
directional system). In Tzeltal, spatial locations
that are north are described as downhill whereas
the ones that are south are described as uphill.
To investigate whether this difference of
linguistic frames employed by a language has
cognitive consequences, Levinson (1996)
conducted a behvioural experiment with Dutch
and Tzeltal speakers over a range of non-
linguistic orientational tasks. The results
indicated that the Dutch speakers
overwhelmingly employed a relational frame,
whereas the Tzeltal speakers relied heavily on
absolute reference in their performance on a
non-linguistic task. The evidence from non-
linguistic behavioural tasks thus indicates that
the referential frame and distinctions made
available by a language constrain spatial thinking
in non-linguistic domains.
Similar results have been reported on tasks
involving spatial relations such as containment
and support. English and Korean are known to
be different in the way they encode the spatial
relations of containment and support. English
distinguishes between putting things into
containers and putting them on surfaces (apple
in the bowl/letter in the envelope versus book
on the table/picture on the wall). Korean
crosscuts this containment versus support
distinction by distinguishing between loose and
tight containment and support. The language
uses the relational term nehta for “apple in the
bowl” as an example of loose containment and
kitta for “letter in the envelope” as an example
of tight fit. Kitta is also used for support as in
“magnet on the refrigerator”, which is again an
instance of close fit. McDonough, Choi, &
Mandler (2003), reported a behavioural
experiment involving a non-linguistic spatial
relations task to investigate whether English and
Korean speakers differed in their cognition of
space along the parameters of support versus
containment and loose versus close fit. Results
showed that the English speakersdid not
distinguish between the close versus loose fit in
picture displays, whereas the Korean speakers
did. When given several examples of close fit,
together with one of loose fit, the Korean
speakers could easily pick the odd man out,
whereas the English speakers could not.
Behavioural studies have shown that cross-
linguistic distinctions in temporal descriptors
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have similar consequences for the way speakers
of these languages conceptualize time
(Boroditsky, 2001).
Another area of investigation in this context is
the cross-linguistic differences in the domain of
gender encoding. Languages are known to opt
for semantic or grammatical encoding of gender
on nouns. Both English and Bangla for example,
opt for semantic gender in the sense that entities
in these languages are either masculine, feminine
or neuter as per their semantic category. Hindi,
on the other hand, opts for grammatical gender
in that the inanimate entities are assigned an
arbitrary masculine/feminine gender, which also
has a grammatical reflex in agreement marking.
Behavioural studies have shown that speakers
of languages with grammatical gender tend to
categorize objects in non-linguistic tasks as
masculine and feminine, depending on how these
objects are categorized in their languages, and
this gender assignment influences the language
users’ cognitive representations of these objects.
In one such experiment, speakers of Spanish
and German (both languages opt for
grammatical gender), were asked to give
similarity judgments on objects. Both groups
rated grammatically feminine objects to be more
similar to females and grammatically masculine
objects as more similar to males. Speakers
assigned masculine or feminine properties to
objects depending upon whether the objects had
masculine or feminine gender in their respective
languages (Boroditsky, Schmidt & Phillips,
2003). In a recent comparative study of Hindi/
English and Bangla/Hindi bilinguals, Mukherjee
(2018), investigated the issue of the relation
between presence versus absence of
grammatical gender in a language, and
conceptualization of inanimate objects in the
Indian context, taking into consideration three
languages: Hindi, Bangla, and English. Of these,
Bangla and English have semantic gender,
whereas Hindi has grammatical gender. The
study sought to investigate how the presence
or absence of grammatical gender in these
languages impacts object categorization by their
bilingual users. The tasks included gender and
voice assignment to different inanimate and
natural objects. The results indicated that the
presence or absence of grammatical gender in
the first language of a bilingual user has an impact
on the user’s object categorization judgment.
Furthermore, if the second language of the
bilingual user is characterized by the presence
of grammatical gender, as in case of Bangla-
Hindi bilinguals, then the bilingual users show
differential behavior with respect to object
characterization, depending on whether they are
simultaneous or sequential bilinguals
(Mukherjee, 2018).
These and several other studies have shown
that speakers of different languages think
differently. The results suggest that
conceptualization is mediated by language, and
what we usually call thinking is actually a
complex set of interactions between linguistic
and conceptual representations and processes.
Implications for Language Pedagogy
Language teachers have for long been
interested in how the similarities and differences
between the source and target language may
help to predict areas of relative ease and
difficulty in language learning. Traditionally,
however, ease and difficulty have been defined
primarily in terms of structural similarities and
differences between the source and target
languages. The neo-Whorfian perspective takes
the pedagogical interest in linguistic diversity
beyond structural similarities and differences.
Since the perspective considers language
similarities and differences as pointers to the
underlying conceptual similarities and
differences, it prepares the ground for the
language teacher to rethink relative ease and
difficulty in terms of conceptual similarities and
differences. Thus, the notions of relative ease
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and difficulty are not defined in terms of
structural similarity and difference, but rather
in terms of conceptual congruence and
incongruence. Accordingly, areas that are
conceptually translatable across languages are
likely to emerge as easier to learn than the ones
that are conceptually untranslatable. Let us
consider an example of what this shift could
entail for language pedagogy.
Multiword non-compositional expressions such
as idiom chunks—an area often relegated to
rote learning—could be approached differently.
At the core of most of such expressions is a
cross-domain metaphorical mapping. The
pedagogical materials need to distinguish
between cross-domain mappings that the source
and target languages share and others that are
different, and focus on mappings that are
peculiar to the target language. Thus, while
metaphorical mappings that entail conceptual
metaphors such as “love is a journey” or
“argument is war” would seem to cut across
Hindi and English, a mapping such as “shy as a
bride” would not. Arbitrary differences in how
cross-domain mappings work cross-linguistically
would therefore be presented as instances of
conceptual incongruence. The untranslatable
mappings would be acknowledged as potential
areas of difficulty and paid attention to. Similar
cross-linguistic studies of linguistic and
conceptual incongruence in the areas of space
and time, grammatical gender, causal relations,
etc., would yield areas that need attention in
the teaching/learning situation.
Summing up, the neo-Whorfian perspective on
linguistic diversity strikes a natural chord with
the language teacher. This approach has two
implications for the language classroom:  a)
bringing the source language back into the
classroom, and b) focussing on source
language-target language similarities and
differences in the conceptual domain, rather than
in the structural one. Both of these implications
have a cognitive linguistic imperative in
common—language learning is a meaning-
centred process, where meaning is equated with
conceptualization.
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